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ABSTRACT 
Since 1969, the music festival remains a staple of American musical 
culture, and in order to meet consumer demands, today’s music festival 
promoters rely on radius clauses ancillary to the performance agreements 
that they use with artists. These radius clauses limit artists’ ability to 
perform at other music festivals and concerts within a specified temporal 
and geographic radius of the contracted music festival. Beginning in 2010, 
legal challenges have alleged that broadly defined radius clauses used by 
music festival promoters violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
This Note contends that radius clauses which limit artists from performing 
beyond the festival’s geographic market and fail to distinguish between 
festivals and concert performances should be considered unreasonable 
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, because such 
radius clauses restrict more competition than is necessary to protect the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1969 Woodstock Music and Arts Fair remains one of the most 
pivotal moments in American music history. Since Woodstock, the 
American music festival has transformed; today over eight hundred music 
festivals occur annually in the United States, attracting approximately 
thirty-two million festival-goers annually.1 But today’s music festivals are 
not just composed of fans, artists, and good times; rather, large-scale 
festival promoters, corporate sponsorships, and the subject of this Note—
radius clauses—are all essential to the American music festival.2 
In order to put on a large music festival, promoters must make large, 
up-front investments, taking great financial risks.3 In order to protect these 
investments, festival promoters rely on radius clauses4 ancillary to the 
performance agreements between promoters and artists.5 A radius clause 
                                                     
 1. Ismini Tsakiris, The Rise and Unfortunate Fall of Music Festivals, GOODMUSICALLDAY, 
https://vergecampus.com/2017/04/rise-fall-music-festivals/ [http://perma.cc/Y45U-KR2S]; For 
Music Fans, the Summer Is All a Stage, NIELSEN (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/ 
insights/news/2015/for-music-fans-the-summer-is-all-a-stage.html [http://perma.cc/MTJ2-74QE]. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See Katie Bain, How the Music Industry Uses a Pervasive Secret Weapon to Keep Bands from 
Freely Touring, LA WEEKLY (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.laweekly.com/music/how-music-festival-
promoters-use-radius-clauses-to-keep-bands-from-freely-touring-8140333 [http://perma.cc/NWY9K 
R4Y]; Karen Gwee, Music Festivals and the Pursuit of Exclusivity, CONSEQUENCE OF SOUND (Sept. 
15, 2016), https://consequenceofsound.net/2016/09/music-festivals-and-the-pursuit-of-exclusivity/ 
[http://perma.cc/NS77-H7PF]. 
 4. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3. 
 5. This Note uses the term “radius clause” to refer to the restrictive covenant included in 
performance contracts between live music promoters and musical artists; these radius clauses are also 
known as “exclusivity clauses” and “blackout dates.” Additionally, this Note uses “artist” to refer to 
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is a type of restrictive covenant that prohibits an artist from performing, or 
advertising for, another music festival or concert within a specified 
temporal and geographic radius of the date and location of the music 
festival.6 Radius clauses are not unique to music festivals; nearly all live 
music promoters, including traditional concert promoters, regularly use 
them to protect their investments as well.7 
However, as music festivals have grown in popularity and scale, the 
temporal and geographic restrictions specified in radius clauses have 
drawn criticism from commentators and legal challenges from music 
festival and concert promoters.8 Specifically, commentators and promoters 
allege that radius clauses with overbroad temporal and geographic 
restrictions unreasonably decrease the supply of live performance artists, 
which causes reductions in the quality and quantity of both music festivals 
and concert venues, in addition to raised prices for live music 
performances—all, these commentators and promoters allege, in violation 
of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Section 1).9 
Motivated to understand the validity of Section 1 claims against 
radius clauses used by large music festival promoters, this Note explores 
the nature of such radius clauses and the analysis that courts would likely 
employ to determine whether radius clauses violate Section 1. Part I will 
discuss radius clauses and their role in the live music industry. Part II will 
provide both a historical and present-day background understanding of the 
American music festival. Part III will cover Section 1, focusing on the rule 
of reason analysis by examining two legal challenges to radius clauses 
used by live music promoters. Finally, Part IV will argue that radius 
clauses used by large music festival promoters unreasonably restrain trade 
in violation of Section 1 when they specify geographical restrictions 
beyond the festival’s relevant geographic market and fail to distinguish 
between concert performances and music festivals. 
I. RADIUS CLAUSES 
Radius clauses are a specific type of ancillary restraint and are not 
exclusive to the live music industry. More commonly, radius clauses 
describe commercial lease agreements that prohibit retail tenants from 
opening a branch store within a specified geographical area that would 
                                                     
any performance act that may be contracted to perform on stage at a music festival. “Artist” may 
include, but is not limited to, individual musicians and bands of all sizes. 
 6. See, e.g., infra Figure 1. 
 7. See Dylan Muhlberg, Grateful Web Interview with Don Strasbury, GRATEFUL WEB (Feb. 7, 
2017), http://www.gratefulweb.com/articles/grateful-web-interview-don-strasburg [http://perma.cc/G 
2BG-HXLU]. 
 8. See infra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 9. See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
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compete directly with the original store.10 Landlords use radius clauses to 
protect their investments, ensuring that the customer base of their property 
is protected from competition.11 Radius clauses used in the live music 
industry and in commercial lease agreements are “ancillary restraints”12 
and can be considered specific types of “restrictive covenants.”13 Ancillary 
restraints are not the main purpose of an agreement or contract, but are 
perceived as “necessary to the protection of the covenantee in the carrying 
out of [the agreement’s] main purpose.”14 Non-compete clauses in 
employment agreements are another type of ancillary restraint.15 
Employers rely on non-compete clauses to protect classified information 
and customer relationships from competitors,16 and typically these 
covenants prohibit the employee from competing with the employer for a 
“specified period of time in a designated geographical area.”17 
In the live music industry, typically when an artist enters into a 
performance agreement, the artist additionally agrees to a radius clause 
ancillary to their performance agreement.18 The radius clause prohibits the 
artist from performing (and often from advertising for) another 
performance for a specific time period within a designated geographical 
radius.19 For example, a performance agreement for a music festival in 
Chicago, Illinois, may include a radius clause that prohibits an artist from 
performing and advertising for a different music festival or concert within 
a 500-mile radius of Chicago for 120 days prior to and following the date 
of the festival.20 Most music festival and concert promoters rely on radius 
                                                     
 10. Jeremy A. Gogel, Antitrust Concerns with Respect to Music Festival Radius Clauses, 38 
LINCOLN L. REV. 87, 88 (2011) (citing Alan M. Disciullo, Geographic and Product Markets for 
Radius Clauses Under the Rule of Reason, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 121, 121 (1990)). Gogel’s article is a 
useful source for understanding the history of restrictive covenants and how the growth of American 
music festivals is burdening smaller artists and bands that sign contracts containing radius clauses in 
order to perform at large, well-attended festivals. 
 11. See id. at 89. 
 12. The idea of an ancillary restraint first appears in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 
85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898). 
 13. See Gogel, supra note 10, at 88–93. 
 14. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 283. 
 15. See Gogel, supra note 10, at 89. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1960). 
 18. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3. 
 19. See id. 
 20. This example is from SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entertainment, LLC, No. 
16-13311, 2017 WL 3616562, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017). React was a club, concert, and festival 
promotion company. Since 2008, React organized large EDM (electronic dance music) concerts and 
festivals in Chicago, Illinois, and used radius clauses in performance agreements with EDM artists; 
these “radius clauses prohibited artists from playing anywhere up to within a 500 mile radius of the 
location of React’s event for periods of 60, 90, or 120 days prior to and following the date of the 
event.” For additional examples of radius clauses in music festival performance agreements, see Scott 
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clauses to protect the large, up-front investments made to put on the 
performances.21 The radius clauses secure exclusive access to artists for 
the terms of the clause, shielding the promoter’s ticket sales or recoupment 
of initial investment from competing promoters.22 
Radius clauses used in the live music industry include enforcement 
mechanisms. If an artist violates the terms of a radius clause by performing 
at or advertising for another music festival or concert, the promoter may 
reclaim a portion of the artist’s performance fee,23 prohibit the artist from 
performing at the music festival or concert,24 or waive the radius clause, 
allowing another promoter to contract the artist in exchange for a 
percentage of the latter promoter’s profits.25 
The restrictive terms of radius clauses that are used in the music 
festival industry have been subject to legal challenges and social criticism. 
For example, in 2010, the Illinois attorney general’s office investigated 
Lollapalooza’s (a music festival held annually in Chicago) use of radius 
clauses for antitrust violations.26 In 2011, Jeremy A. Gogel argued in a law 
review article titled Antitrust Concerns with Respect to Music Festival 
Radius Clauses that music festival radius clauses violate Section 1.27 In 
2017, Eagle Theater Entertainment (a live music promoter) alleged in a 
counterclaim against SFX React-Operating (another live music promoter) 
that SFX’s use of radius clauses violated both Section 1 and the Michigan 
Antitrust Reform Act.28 Finally, in 2018, Soul’d Out Productions29 (an 
Oregon-based live music promoter) filed a complaint with the U.S. District 
                                                     
Hiller, Exclusive Dealings and Its Effects: The Impact of Large Music Festivals on Local Music 
Venues, 45 REV. INDUS. ORG. 153, 170–71 (2014); Gwee, supra note 3. 
 21. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3. 
 22. Gogel, supra note 10, at 104; see also Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3; Muhlberg, 
supra note 7. 
 23. See Bain, supra note 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. E.g., SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *2 (React agreed to waive some artists’ radius clause 
restriction so that the artists could perform for a different promoter in exchange for fifty percent of 
that promoter’s profits.). 
 26. Steve Knopper, Attorney General Investigates Lollapalooza, ROLLING STONE (June 25, 
2010, 7:45 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/attorney-general-investigates-lolla 
palooza-233557/ [https://perma.cc/AS3U-H29L]. The 2010 restrictions in Lollapalooza’s radius 
clauses prohibited artists from performing at competing music festivals or concerts that were located 
within a 300-mile radius of the festival for 180 days before and 90 days after the music festival. Id. 
 27. See generally Gogel, supra note 10. 
 28. SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *1–2 (React’s radius clauses “prohibited artists from playing 
anywhere up to within a 500 mile radius of the location of React’s event for periods of 60, 90, or 120 
days prior to and following the date of the event.”). 
 29. See generally SOUL’D OUT MUSIC FESTIVAL, http://www.souldoutfestival.com [https:// 
perma.cc/HY3C-ZA4P]. 
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Court in Oregon against five defendants30 (all live music promoters) 
alleging that the defendants’ use of radius clauses (see Figure 1 below) for 
the 2018 Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival (Coachella)31 in Indio, 
California, violated Section 1 as well as Oregon and California antitrust 
laws.32 





















The challenges and criticism described above allege that the radius 
clauses used by music festival promoters have anticompetitive effects that 
violate Section 1. Specifically, the radius clauses unreasonably restrain 
and cause harm to (1) smaller or less well-known artists,34 (2) smaller-
scale music festival and concert promoters who are located within the 
                                                     
 30. Second Amended Complaint at 2, Soul’d Out Prod., LLC v. Anschutz Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. 
3:18-cv-00598-MO (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2018) [hereinafter Second Am. Compl.]. 
 31. See generally COACHELLA, https://www.coachella.com [https://perma.cc/R7L6-KNBZ]. 
 32. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 30. 
 33. Id. at 3 (from a “portion of an email received from AEG’s counsel”). 
 34. See Gogel, supra note 10, at 88. 
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geographical area of a large music festival’s radius clause,35 and (3) 
consumers.36 
In order to fully understand how courts will likely examine legal 
challenges to radius clauses, one must appreciate the history and 
characteristics of today’s American music festival market. 
II. THE AMERICAN MUSIC FESTIVAL AND LARGE-SCALE  
CONCERT PROMOTERS 
Although the American music festival has evolved substantially 
since its inception, today’s music festivals share important characteristics 
with their pioneering predecessors. And yet, with the surge of millennial 
consumer demand comes corporate sponsorships and large-scale 
promoters that, together, fuel intensifying radius clauses.37 
For many, the American music festival narrative begins with the 
1969 Woodstock Music and Art Fair (Woodstock).38 However, one of the 
first large American music festivals to attract nationally known artists was 
the three-day Newport Jazz Festival in 1954, which featured, among other 
legendary artists, Ray Charles, John Coltrane, Miles Davis, and Duke 
Ellington.39 And in 1967, two years before Woodstock, Jimi Hendrix set 
his guitar ablaze while performing at the Monterey Pop Festival.40 
Although Woodstock was not the first music festival, its mark on 
American culture creates an important context for understanding today’s 
music festivals. 
In spite of its fame, Woodstock was not a complete success. 
Woodstock’s promoters (Artie Kornfield, Michael Lang, John Roberts, 
and Joel Rosenman) set out to create more than a music festival; they 
wanted a “proper festival with arts and crafts, and a literal sense of youth 
community.”41 Woodstock’s promoters originally anticipated no more 
                                                     
 35. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL 
3616562, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017); Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 4; Bain, supra 
note 3. 
 36. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *9–10. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 30. 
 37. For an example of intensifying radius clauses compare Knopper, supra note 26 (explaining 
that the 2010 restrictions in Lollapalooza’s radius clauses prohibited artists from performing at 
competing music festivals or concerts for 180 days before and 90 days after the music festival within 
a 300-mile radius) with supra Figure 1, which shows a radius clause that covers all of North America. 
 38. About, WOODSTOCK, www.woodstock.com/about [https://perma.cc/SRZ8-LKDP]. 
 39. MARLEY BRANT, JOIN TOGETHER! FORTY YEARS OF THE ROCK FESTIVAL 3 (2008). 
Additionally, the Newport Jazz festival inspired the Newport Folk Festival, which in 1959 introduced 
“artists such as Bob Dylan and Joan Baez.” Id. 
 40. Ben Sisaro, Monterey Pop, the Festival That Sparked It All, Returns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/arts/music/monterey-pop-festival-50th-anniversary. 
html [https://perma.cc/U37H-46W7]. 
 41. BRANT, supra note 39, at 60, 62. Michael Lang, at age seventy-four, is one of the promoters 
of “Woodstock 50,” the fifty-year anniversary of the 1969 Woodstock. Ben Sisario, Woodstock 
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than fifty thousand attendees;42 however, nearly four hundred thousand 
arrived.43 Spending between $135,00044 and $180,00045 on talent, 
Woodstock’s promoters charged attendees $7 for a day pass and $21 to 
attend the festival for the whole weekend.46 The total production cost of 
Woodstock “ran around $2 million,” and Woodstock’s promoters did not 
profit or break even—in the words of promoter Artie Kornfield, 
Woodstock was a “financial disaster.”47 Woodstock’s lack of financial 
success set the stage for today’s music festival promoters’ justification for 
using radius clauses: to protect initial investments.48 
Despite the financial shortfalls of Woodstock, the American music 
festival has grown into a large corporate industry. Today, over eight 
hundred music festivals exist in the United States,49 attracting over thirty-
two million music fans annually.50 For the millennial generation, which 
comprise nearly half of American music festival attendees,51 attending a 
multi-day music festival is a “rite of passage.”52 And a profitable one at 
that; for example, “Coachella’s 2017 revenues were record setting: the 
festival was attended by 250,000 people and grossed $114.6 million.”53 
Additionally, today’s music festivals are increasingly controlled by “large 
scale promoters,” or “music industry corporations,” which control the 
promotion of multiple music festivals and concerts.54 For example, large-
scale promoter Live Nation Entertainment controls Lollapalooza, Austin 
City Limits, Electric Daisy Carnival, and Bonnaroo.55 Moreover, large-
                                                     
Returns Again on the Festival’s 50th Anniversary, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2019/01/09/arts/music/woodstock-50th-anniversary-festival.html?action=click&module=Featu 
res&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/WKQ7-JFRR]. 
 42. BRANT, supra note 39, at 63. 
 43. Sisaro, supra note 40. 
 44. Id. 
 45. BRANT, supra note 39, at 63. 
 46. Id. at 83. Although, at some point during the festival, the promoters decided to stop charging 
for admission, letting anyone who wanted to attend. See WOODSTOCK (Warner Bros. 1970). 
 47. BRANT, supra note 39, at 82. In Michael Wadleigh’s 1970 Academy Award-winning 
documentary film, Woodstock, Michael Lang is interviewed during the festival and asked if the festival 
needs to make two million dollars to break even. Lang replies, “Well, if we are going to break even, 
you know. [The] point is that it’s happened and its working, you know. That’s enough for now.” 
WOODSTOCK, supra note 41. 
 48. See Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, supra note 3; Muhlberg, supra note 7. 
 49. Tsakiris, supra note 1. 
 50. For Music Fans, the Summer is All a Stage, supra note 1. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Tsakiris, supra note 1. 
 53. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 2. 
 54. See Pete Mason, The Commercialization of Music Festivals and the Rise of Super Concerts, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/petemason/thecommercializat 
ion-of-_1_b_7873236.html [http://perma.cc/MVV3-AT5G]; see also Sisario, supra note 41. 
 55. See Ben Sisario, The Music Festival Business: Who Owns What, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/28/business/media/The-Music-Festival-Business-
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scale promoters have the ability and resources to engage in vertical 
integration, controlling the land, talent, infrastructure, and festival 
vending.56 
Large-scale promoters have immense resources and thus the ability 
to offer consumers more than their independent counterparts. Today’s 
music festivals offer a plethora of artists spanning multiple music genres.57 
For example, Coachella’s 2019 artist line-up features headlining artists in 
the musical genres of rap (Childish Gambino), psychedelic alternative 
(Tame Impala), and pop (Ariana Grande), in addition to featuring Latin 
trap (Bad Bunny), country (Kasey Musgraves), K-pop (BLACK PINK), 
EDM (Zedd), and DJ sets (Driis).58 And, in the spirit of Woodstock, 
today’s music festivals offer consumers more than just music: 
Festivals offer their customers a different experience from single 
concerts. Many festivals try to provide a festival or carnival-like 
vacation experience for their clients. These large festivals provide a 
weekend’s worth of entertainment, beyond just music. Many festivals 
have multiple stages, with music performed on each of the stages. 
Many festivals have art installations. Festivals also try to ensure that 
festival-goers get to enjoy a large selection of food and beverage 
options from a diverse selection of restaurants, breweries, wineries, 
food trucks, and other providers. This experience can be thought of 
as a bundle of individual concerts to which the consumer purchases 
access with so many performances the consumer cannot possibly see 
them all, as well as the other experiences referenced herein.59 
By offering consumers multiple artists across genres and a wide 
selection of entertainment, today’s music festivals attract consumers with 
unique characteristics. 
Consumers of today’s music festivals are primarily millennials60 and 
are willing to travel further and pay more for the music festival experience; 
                                                     
Who-Owns-What.html [https://perma.cc/UBZ2-E7WF] (providing other examples of large-scale 
promoters, including AEG Live, which controls Coachella and Stagecoach, and SFX, which controls 
Tomorrowworld, Electric Zoo, and Mysteryland, USA). 
 56. See Mason, supra note 54. 
 57. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 9. See generally BONNAROO MUSIC AND ARTS 
FESTIVAL, https://www.bonnaroo.com/lineup/ [https://perma.cc/VG22-WY48]; COACHELLA, https:// 
www.coachella.com [https://perma.cc/R7L6-KNBZ]; LOLLAPALOOZA, https://www.lollapalooza. 
com [https://perma.cc/WW5M-F6GW]. 
 58. See COACHELLA, supra note 57; see also Marc Hogan & Michelle Kim, 6 Takeaways from 
the 2019 Coachella Lineup, PITCHFORK (Jan. 3, 2019), https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/6-takeaways-
from-the-2019-coachella-lineup/ [https://perma.cc/LL35-HJWC]. 
 59. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 9–10. See generally BONNAROO MUSIC AND ARTS 
FESTIVAL, supra note 57; COACHELLA, supra note 57; LOLLAPALOOZA, supra note 57. 
 60. In 2015, nearly half of all music musical festival attendees were between the ages of eighteen 
and thirty-four (i.e., millennials). For Music Fans, the Summer Is All a Stage, supra note 1; Trips 
Reddy, Six Factors Driving the Growth of Music Festivals, UMBEL (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.umbel. 
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these characteristics attract lucrative corporate sponsors.61 Multi-day 
music festival admissions cost hundreds of dollars62 and the cost to camp 
at the festival for the weekend is not included.63 Additionally, the cost of 
traveling to music festivals must be considered. While the average 
attendee of a traditional concert will travel forty-three miles (and ten 
percent will travel over 100 miles),64 the average attendee of music 
festivals will travel 903 miles.65 Moreover, tickets to multi-day music 
festivals typically sell out within hours—before the artists to perform are 
announced. For example, the 201766 and 201867 Coachella sold out of 
festival passes within hours of going on sale—and before the lists of artists 
to perform were announced.68 Given the demographics and spending 
habits of music festival consumers, it is not surprising music festivals also 
attract corporate sponsors. Attracted by the opportunity to reach a large 
and captive audience for several days, corporate sponsors offer large-scale 
promoters significant compensation.69 
With corporate sponsorship and sold-out crowds that pay hundreds 
and thousands of dollars to attend a multi-day music festival, large-scale 
                                                     
com/blog/entertainment/6-factors-driving-massive-growth-of-music-festivals/ [http://perma.cc/ 
TY25-8A6Q]. And in 2018, millennials are between the age of twenty-two and thirty-seven. Michael 
Dimock, Defining Generations: Where Millennials End and Post-Millenials Begin, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/01/defining-generations-where-mille 
nnials-end-and-post-millennials-begin/ [https://perma.cc/GU6D-J6EC]. 
 61. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 62. COACHELLA, https://www.coachella.com/passes [https://perma.cc/7MZC-9E94] (Admission 
to Coachella’s 2019 festival is $429 for general admission and $999 for a VIP pass.). 
 63. Id. (Camping packages for Coachella’s 2019 festival range from $125 to $9,500.). 
 64. How Far Have Fans Traveled to See the Artists They Love?, TICKETMASTER (Oct. 20, 2015) 
[hereinafter How Far Have Fans Traveled], https://blog.ticketmaster.com/concert-road-trips/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q7TX-F83E]; see also Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 10. 
 65. Megan Leonhardt, What It Really Costs to Attend Coachella, MONEY (Apr. 9, 2018, 1:37 
PM), http://time.com/money/4294043/cost-of-coachella/ [https://perma.cc/4HYT-G8K5]; see also 
Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 10. 
 66. Andy Hermann, Coachella Is Already Sold Out, LA WEEKLY (Jan. 4, 2017, 2:56 PM), https:// 
www.laweekly.com/music/coachella-is-already-sold-out-7784292 [https://perma.cc/PWB8-NUVC]. 
 67. Ryan Castillo, Coachella 2018 Sells out Both Weekends in Record Time, DANCING 
ASTRONAUT (Jan. 6, 2018), https://dancingastronaut.com/2018/01/coachella-2018-sells-weekends/ 
[https://perma.cc/48YW-BSBX]. 
 68. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 16. 
 69. See Reddy, supra note 60. 
Today, the popular festivals are able to sell out just hours after they start selling tickets. 
Sponsors and advertisers are willing to spend millions of dollars to target what they know 
is a truly captive audience, for a whole weekend. Music festival sponsorship spending has 
been growing exponentially over the last couple of years. According to IEG, LLC, North 
American-based companies spent more than $1.5 billion sponsoring music venues, 
festivals and tours in 2014, a 4.4% increase from 2013. The biggest sponsor, beer-
manufacturer Anheuser-Busch, is partnered with 31% of U.S. music festivals followed by 
Pepsico, Coca-Cola, Heineken and Red Bull. 
Id. 
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promoters are able to: (1) afford bigger, more popular artists; (2) 
compensate these artists in exchange for agreeing to increasingly 
restrictive radius clauses;70 (3) which attract sold out crowds;71 (4) that 
attract lucrative corporate sponsorships;72 (5) which increases the large-
scale promoter’s ability to expand. Further, because large-scale promoters 
control multiple festivals and concerts, a large-scale promoter may waive 
their radius clauses, allowing an artist to perform without penalty at a 
different festival or concert that the promoter also controls.73 This 
pervasive cycle feeds the intensification of radius clauses, leading to more 
legal challenges, and criticisms that radius clauses used by music festivals 
violate Section 1.74 Advocates attempting to bring a successful Section 1 
challenge to radius clauses used by large music festivals must be familiar 
with how present-day courts analyze Section 1 claims; specifically, 
advocates must be prepared to apply the live music industry to the rule of 
reason analysis. 
III. HOW COURTS ANALYZE RADIUS CLAUSES FOR SECTION ONE OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT CLAIMS 
A. Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
In 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed “to protect the public 
from the failure[s] of the market . . . not against conduct which is 
competitive . . . but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy 
competition itself.”75 Under Section 1, every contract that restrains 
interstate trade or commerce is deemed unlawful.76 And, in general, 
American courts disfavor restraints on trade, like radius clauses, because 
society values competition more than an ability to contract.77 Therefore, a 
                                                     
 70. See Bain, supra note 3. 
 71. See Hermann, supra note 66; Castillo, supra note 67. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 21–24; Bain, supra note 3. 
 74. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 75. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
 76. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both 
said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
Id. 
 77. Richard A. Kaye, Cause of Action to Enforce Noncompetition Covenant in Employment 
Contract, in 36 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 103, § 6 (2008), available at Westlaw 36 COA2d 103 (through 
Mar. 2019) (citing Genzyme Corp. v. Bishop, 460 F. Supp. 2d. 939 (W.D. Wis. 2006)). 
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strict reading of Section 1 would exact that any restrictive covenants—like 
the radius clauses used by music festival promoters—are, on their face, a 
violation of Section 1 because the temporal and geographical restrictions 
specified in the radius clauses prohibit an artist from performing in several 
states, restricting the supply of artists across those states. For example, 
Lollapalooza music festival in Chicago, Illinois, used radius clauses that 
prohibited artists from performing for up to 270 days within a 300-mile 
radius of Chicago,78 preventing artists from performing at festivals and 
concerts in Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin.79 
However, the intent of the Sherman Antitrust Act was to provide 
guiding principles for facilitating competitive activities and leave room for 
courts to determine the legality of particular conduct.80 Indeed, in the 1897 
case United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, the Supreme Court 
discussed the Sherman Antitrust Act, indicating that it may only prohibit 
unreasonable restraints of trade.81 
It is now with much amplification of argument urged that the statute, 
in declaring illegal every combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, does not 
                                                     
 78. Gwee, supra note 3. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911). In discussing Section 1, the 
Court wrote: 
And as the contracts or acts embraced in the provision were not expressly defined, since 
the enumeration addressed itself simply to classes of acts, those classes being broad enough 
to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning 
trade or commerce or the subjects of such commerce, and thus caused any act done by any 
of the enumerated methods anywhere in the whole field of human activity to be illegal if 
in restraint of trade, it inevitably follows that the provision necessarily called for the 
exercise of judgment which required that some standard should be resorted to for the 
purpose of determining whether the prohibition contained in the statute had or had not in 
any given case been violated. Thus not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and 
requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had 
been applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character 
embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining 
whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against 
which the statute provided. 
Id. at 60. Additionally, the Supreme Court, since as early as 1871, has recognized legitimate objectives 
for imposing restrictive covenants and began upholding such covenants when the restrictions did not 
pose an oppressive burden and when reasonable grounds existed for imposing the restriction. Or. 
Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64, 68 (1874) (holding that a non-compete contract is valid 
when the public is not deprived of the restricted party’s industry, when the party restricted is not 
prevented from pursuing their occupation, and when reasonable grounds of benefit exists to the other 
party); see also Gogel, supra note 10, at 91. 
 81. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 327–28 (1897). And in 
1911, the Court held the Sherman Antitrust Act only prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade. 
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 59–60. 
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mean what the language used therein plainly imports, but that it only 
means to declare illegal any such contract which is in unreasonable 
restraint of trade . . . the common-law meaning of the term “contract 
in restraint of trade” includes only such contracts as are in 
unreasonable restraint of trade . . . .82 
Today, in order to establish a Section 1 violation, three elements must 
be met: (1) an agreement must exist (2) that affects interstate commerce 
and (3) that unreasonably restrains trade.83 Therefore, radius clauses used 
in the live music industry violate Section 1 when a court finds their 
restraint on trade unreasonable. 
Further, in 1918, in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, the 
Court upheld a restraint on trade,84 and in doing so, provided guidance for 
determining when a restraint is unreasonable. Delivering the opinion for 
the Court, Justice Brandeis articulates one of the earliest formulations of 
what is commonly referred to today as the “rule of reason” analysis: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To 
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint 
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.85 
Therefore, according to Justice Brandeis, radius clauses used in the 
live music industry will not violate Section 1 when they merely regulate, 
“and perhaps thereby promote[] competition,” rather than “suppress or 
even destroy competition.”86 But how will today’s courts analyze radius 
clauses to determine if they are reasonable or unreasonable restraints on 
trade? 
Today, courts analyze Section 1 claims and, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, determine the reasonableness of a restraint after 
applying one of the following: a per se rule, a “quick-look” analysis, or a 
rule of reason analysis.87 Generally, courts find that a restraint on trade is 
a per se violation of Section 1 when the restraint has “such predictable and 
                                                     
 82. Id. 
 83. SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL 3616562, 
at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 
495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
 84. See generally Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 85. Id. at 238. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7–11. 
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pernicious anticompetitive effects and such limited potential for 
procompetitive benefit”88 that the restraint “would always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,”89 and when the 
court can predict—with confidence—that a rule of reason analysis would 
condemn the restraint as unreasonable90 (e.g., when a court previously 
reviewed the same restraint using a rule of reason analysis and found that 
the restraint unreasonably suppressed competition91). Overall, a court need 
not engage in an elaborate industry analysis to demonstrate the restraint’s 
anticompetitive character when it finds a restraint per se unreasonable.92 
Therefore, it is unlikely that a court, in the near future, will find a 
promoter’s radius clauses per se unreasonable (1) because justifications, 
or procompetitive benefits, exist for using radius clauses (i.e., to protect 
large, up-front investments made by promoters);93 and (2) because a court 
has not yet reviewed, and found illegal, radius clauses using a rule of 
reason analysis.94 
Similar to the per se rule, a quick-look analysis does not require an 
elaborate industry analysis; however, a court will take a “quick-look” at 
the defendant’s procompetitive justification before finding a restraint 
unreasonable.95 Indeed, a quick-look analysis is appropriate when “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive 
                                                     
 88. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); see also SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6. 
 89. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (“Per se rules are invoked 
when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render 
unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.”); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6. 
 90. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10; see also SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6. 
 91. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *6 (citing In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 271 
(6th Cir. 2014)). 
 92. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (drawing a 
distinction between restraints that are per se illegal and restraints requiring a rule of reason analysis, 
the Court finds that “agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that 
no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality” are illegal per se). 
 93. See Motion to Dismiss at 26–27, Soul’d Out Prods., LLC v. Anschutz Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. 
3:18-cv-00598-MO (D. Or. June 25, 2018) [herienafter Mot. Dismiss]; Bain, supra note 3; Gwee, 
supra note 3; Muhlberg, supra note 7. 
 94. Indeed, only two claims have been brought before a court alleging that a live music 
promoter’s use of a radius clause is a violation of Section 1: in one case, the court held “that Defendants 
have not alleged facts that would place this case into one of the limited categories that have been 
collectively deemed per se anticompetitive,” SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7 (engaging, on a motion 
for summary judgment, a rule of reason to analyze the radius clauses used by a music promoter and 
finding that the plaintiff established a prima facie antitrust case; however, the motion to dismiss was 
granted on successor liability and bankruptcy reorganization grounds), and in the other, the plaintiff 
did not allege a per se violation, Second Am. Compl., supra note 30 (this case is currently in the 
pleading stage). 
 95. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7. 
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effect on customers and markets.”96 But when the defendant’s justification 
for a restraint is “not easily rejected” by the court, the court will not find 
the restraint unreasonable under a quick-look analysis, but will proceed to 
the more elaborate rule of reason analysis.97 Like the per se rule above, 
courts are unlikely to find radius clauses used in the live music industry 
unreasonable under a quick-look analysis because live music promoters 
can offer at least two justifications that are not easily rejected: (1) “to 
protect attendance at [the promoter’s festival or concert] . . . from being 
diminished by fans attending another performance of a featured artist 
elsewhere around the same date” and location;98 and (2) “to protect [the 
promoter] from competitors unfairly free-riding on its creative choices in 
selecting its artist lineup and its investment in ensuring those artists will 
come to” a specific geographical location at a specific time.99 Therefore, 
it is likely that before a court determines whether radius clauses are 
unreasonable restraints on trade—and, if so, under what circumstances—
it will apply a rule of reason analysis.100 
Unlike the per se rule and the quick-look analysis, the rule of reason 
analysis “utilizes a burden-shifting framework that allows the court to 
‘analyze the history of the restraint and the restraint’s effect on 
competition.’”101 This burden-shifting framework consists of three stages. 
First, the “plaintiff has the initial burden to prove” the restraint on trade 
                                                     
 96. Id. (citing examples first from Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 
85, 99–100 (1984) (“[T]he league’s television plan expressly limited output . . . and fixed a minimum 
price.”); then citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (“[T]he restraint was ‘an absolute 
ban on competitive bidding.’”); and then citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 
U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (“[T]he restraint was ‘a horizontal agreement among the participating dentists to 
withhold from their customers a particular service that they desire[d].’”)). 
 97. Id. (“[T]he procompetitive justification proffered by [defendant] . . . is not as easily rejected. 
The Court next turns to the rule of reason analysis.”). 
 98. Id. at *2.  
 99. Mot. Dismiss, supra note 93, at 26–27. 
 100. Indeed, in SFX, this is exactly what the court determined. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, 
at *7. And interestingly, in the pending case against AEG’s use of radius clauses for the 2018 
Coachella, plaintiff Soul’d Out alleged that AEG violated Section 1 under a quick-look analysis 
because the radius clauses placed a “naked restraint” on the supply of artists, which limited output, 
decreasing the quality of both music festivals and concerts within the scope of the radius. See Second 
Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 35–36. However, Soul’d Out additionally alleged that AEG had no 
justification that could offset the anticompetitive effects of its radius clauses. Id. But Soul’d Out’s 
allegation will not likely be accepted by a court for the simple reason that AEG did offer a justification, 
and AEG’s justification likely requires examination under a rule of reason analysis before its offsetting 
potential can be credibly determined. For AEG’s justification, see supra note 99 and accompanying 
text. 
 101. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nat’l Hockey 
League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003)); see 
also SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7. Notice the similarity between the language employed in National 
Hockey League Players’ Ass’n and Justice Brandeis’ articulation of the rule of reason in 1918. See 
supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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“has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the 
relevant” product and geographic market.102 Second, if the plaintiff meets 
its burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the 
restraint’s procompetitive effects sufficiently justify the anticompetitive 
injuries of the restraint.103 And third, if the defendant provides a sufficient 
justification, the plaintiff may prevail by showing that the defendant’s 
legitimate objectives, achieved by the restraint on trade, can be similarly 
achieved by less restrictive means.104 At bottom, a rule of reason analysis 
should reveal whether radius clauses merely regulate and “promote 
competition,” or whether they “suppress or even destroy competition.”105 
As discussed above, it is unlikely that a court would apply a per se 
rule or quick-look analysis to determine whether radius clauses used in the 
live music industry unreasonably restrain competition; therefore, a court 
will likely subject a Section 1 challenge of a music festival’s radius clause 
to a rule of reason analysis. A court’s determination on whether a radius 
clause is, on balance, unreasonable will likely hinge on the advocacy and 
findings in three areas: (1) the definition of relevant product and 
geographic markets, (2) the showing of anticompetitive effects, and (3) the 
viability of promoter justifications. By examining two radius-clause cases, 
                                                     
 102. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018); see also In re Se. Milk Antitrust 
Litig., 739 F.3d at 272 (citing Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 2006)); 
SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7. 
 103. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d at 272 (citing Expert Masonry, 440 F.3d at 343); 
see also Ohio, 138 S. Ct. at 2284; SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7. 
 104. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d at 272 (citing Expert Masonry, 440 F.3d at 343); 
see also Ohio, 138 S. Ct. at 2284; SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7. To illustrate how the rule of reason’s 
burden shifting framework would be applied to a music festival’s radius clause, imagine the following 
hypothetical: Bigfoot Music Festival (Bigfoot), located in Washington State, contracted with artists; 
as part of these contracts, artists were prohibited from performing at any festival or concert anywhere 
in Washington for ninety days before and after their performance at Bigfoot. The Soundbox is a 
concert venue located in Washington. Imagine that Bigfoot is a wild success and contracts with many 
popular artists, and further imagine that The Soundbox is struggling to attract popular artists to 
perform. Therefore, The Soundbox files a Section 1 claim alleging Bigfoot’s radius clauses restrict the 
supply of artists in the market for live music in Washington, and as a result, The Soundbox is no longer 
able to obtain artists who are sufficiently popular to sustain business, thus harming consumers of live 
music in Washington (because consumers now have one less venue to see live performances). If The 
Soundbox demonstrates that Bigfoot’s radius clauses have a substantial anticompetitive effect that 
harms consumers in the relevant product and geographic market, see supra note 102 and 
accompanying text, the burden shifts to Bigfoot to demonstrate its justification for using radius 
clauses. Bigfoot will argue that without radius clauses, The Soundbox—and every other festival and 
concert venue in Washington—would take advantage of the fact that Bigfoot already invests for most 
of the popular artists to travel to Washington because other festivals and concert venues will contract 
those same artists to perform in the days immediately before and after Bigfoot, thus diminishing 
consumer demand for Bigfoot. Unless The Soundbox can undermine Bigfoot’s justification or 
demonstrate that a less restrictive alternative exists for Bigfoot to protect its initial investment, 
Bigfoot’s radius clauses will not be considered a Section 1 violation. 
 105. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *7 (citing Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 
U.S. 183, 203 n.10 (2010)) (internal citations omitted). 
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SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entertainment, LLC (SFX) 
and Soul’d Out Productions, LLC v. Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. 
(Soul’d Out), insights into how attorneys and courts are currently thinking 
and analyzing these issues can be gained. 
B. SFX and Soul’d Out 
SFX and Soul’d Out are the only two examples of Section 1 
challenges of radius clauses in the live music industry; as such, it is worth 
summarizing the facts and issues of each case. 
In SFX, SFX React-Operating LLC (React) was a music festival, 
club, and concert promoter, and Eagle Theater Entertainment, LLC 
(Eagle) was a similar live music promoter.106 As a counterclaim, Eagle 
alleged that the radius clauses used by React, when React entered into 
agreements with electronic dance music (EDM) artists to perform at 
React’s EDM music festivals, were unreasonable and in violation of 
Section 1.107 React specialized in promoting large EDM festivals and 
concerts in Chicago108 and it used radius clauses in its agreements with 
approximately one hundred EDM artists. These radius clauses prohibited 
the EDM artists from playing anywhere within a 500-mile radius of 
React’s events for periods of sixty, ninety, or 120 days prior to and 
following the date of React’s events.109 The U.S. Eastern District Court in 
Michigan applied a rule of reason analysis, finding that Eagle established 
a prima facie Section 1 case before it granted React’s motion to dismiss 
Eagle’s Section 1 antitrust counterclaim on successor liability and 
bankruptcy reorganization grounds.110 
While Soul’d Out is still in the pleading stages, Soul’d Out 
Productions’111 second amended complaint112 builds a compelling case 
and is therefore worth discussing. Soul’d Out Productions is a live music 
promoter that promotes the annual Soul’d Out Music Festival.113 Soul’d 
Out Music Festival is a “multi-venue live music event in Portland, Oregon 
featuring a narrow set of genres, primarily those associated with ‘soul 
music’ such as jazz, reggae, hip-hop, funk, and blues.”114 
                                                     
 106. SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *1. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at *11–12. 
 111. See generally SOUL’D OUT MUSIC FESTIVAL, supra note 29. 
 112. See generally Second Am. Compl., supra note 30. 
 113. See SOUL’D OUT MUSIC FESTIVAL, supra note 29. 
 114. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 12. 
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In 2018, Soul’d Out Productions filed a complaint with the U.S. 
District Court in Oregon against five defendants (AEG)115 (the large-scale 
live music promoters responsible for promoting Coachella)116 alleging that 
Coachella’s use of radius clauses (shown in Figure 1)117 violated 
Section 1.118 Specifically, Soul’d Out Productions alleges that AEG, as the 
second largest concert promoter in the United States, has the power to 
remove artists from the concert promoter market in the Pacific Northwest 
with its radius clauses that prohibit the performance and advertisement of 
festivals, themed events, and concerts in North America.119 Soul’d Out 
Productions alleges that Coachella’s radius clauses harm it and other 
Pacific Northwest concert promoters, making them “unable to retain talent 
from the limited pool of artists on tour in their geographic market during 
the relevant season, driving up costs, and reducing the quality of their 
offerings to the public.”120 
The district court’s summary judgment analysis in SFX and the 
pleadings from Soul’d Out provide useful context for explaining and 
understanding the three most complex and likely contentious elements of 
determining whether specific radius clauses are unreasonable restraints of 
trade in violation of Section 1: defining relevant product and geographic 
markets, showing anticompetitive effects, and promoter justifications. 
1. Defining Relevant Product and Geographic Markets 
As part of demonstrating a Section 1 violation, plaintiffs generally 
must show that the defendant enjoyed market power in the relevant 
product and geographic markets.121 Market power is normally inferred 
when an entity possesses a substantial percentage of the relevant product 
and geographic markets.122 The more broadly a product or geographic 
market is defined, the more difficult it is to show that an entity possesses 
                                                     
 115. See id. at 1. 
 116. Coachella Valley Music & Arts Festival, AEG, https://www.aegworldwide.com/divisions/ 
music/coachella-valley-music-arts-festival [https://perma.cc/PY9W-Z8XE]. 
 117. See supra Figure 1. 
 118. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 38–67. Soul’d Out Productions also alleged that 
Coachella’s use of radius clauses violated Oregon and California antitrust laws. Id. 
 119. See id. at 30–31. Soul’d out productions also alleges “Tying,” “Quick Look,” “Horizontal 
Restraint Among Festivals,” a similar Section 1 claim alleging the “West Coast Market” in the 
alternative, and “Hub and Spoke” theories of Section 1 antitrust claims. See id. at 32–38. However, 
such theories are outside the focus of this Note. 
 120. Id. at 38. 
 121. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL 
3616562, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v. 
Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 530–31 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 122. See id. at *10 (citing Mfrs. Supply Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 688 F. Supp. 303, 307 
(W.D. Mich. 1988)). 
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market power.123 And without market power, an entity cannot have an 
anticompetitive effect in violation of Section 1.124 Therefore, carefully 
defined relevant product and geographic markets are critical to show a 
Section 1 violation. 
A relevant geographic market can be defined as the “area of effective 
competition” in which the defendant competes.125 For example, the SFX 
court considered the nature of the EDM concert industry, finding that since 
concerts are a service industry, convenience is an important driver. Thus, 
the court concluded that it can be reasonably inferred that most 
concertgoers are from areas within Metro Detroit (the area in which both 
React and Eagle promoted the festivals and concerts that were the subject 
of Eagle’s Section 1 claims).126 While the radius clauses that React used 
specified a 500-mile geographic radius, the court found the relative 
geographic market to be Metro Detroit, a significantly smaller geographic 
range, because Metro Detroit was the geographic range in which both 
React and Eagle competed for concertgoers.127 In Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out 
Productions alleges that the Pacific Northwest (i.e., Washington and 
Oregon) is the relevant geographical market: 
Ticket revenues from Soul’d Out Productions’ concerts establish that 
hard-ticket concert consumers in Washington and Oregon are willing 
to commute approximately 3–5 hours to see concerts—roughly the 
distance from Seattle to Portland. Hard-tickets sold for the Soul’d Out 
Music Festival’s individual concerts are mostly purchased from 
customers throughout Washington and Oregon. TicketMaster’s study 
showed that the average concert attendee travels 43 miles to see a 
                                                     
 123. See, e.g., Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249–52 (1959) 
(finding that the defendant’s market power would diminish as the relevant product market is broadened 
to include more boxing matches). 
 124. Davis-Watkins Co. v. Serv. Merch., 686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 125. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949). Justice 
Frankfurter discussed in a footnote the purpose and methodology for defining relevant geographic 
markets: 
It is clear, of course, that the ‘line of commerce’ affected need not be nationwide, at least 
where the purchasers cannot, as a practical matter, turn to suppliers outside their own area. 
Although the effect on competition will be quantitatively the same if a given volume of the 
industry’s business is assumed to be covered, whether or not the affected sources of supply 
are those of the industry as a whole or only those of a particular region, a purely quantitative 
measure of this effect is inadequate because the narrower the area of competition, the 
greater the comparative effect on the area’s competitors. Since it is the preservation of 
competition which is at stake, the significant proportion of coverage is that within the area 
of effective competition. 
Id. 
 126. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *10. 
 127. See id. at *10–11. 
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concert, and 10% of buyers have traveled more than 100 miles to see 
a show.128 
Similar to SFX, Soul’d Out Productions alleges a geographic market 
substantially smaller than the scope specified in Coachella’s radius 
clauses, which cover California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and 
Arizona.129 From SFX and Soul’d Out, it appears that relevant geographic 
markets in the live music industry are defined by the average distance that 
festivalgoers or concertgoers are willing to travel to attend the music 
festival or concert. 
A relevant product market exists when products have reasonable 
interchangeability.130 Therefore, relevant product markets turn on the 
availability of substitutes.131 And the availability of substitutes involves an 
analysis of the cross-elasticity of market demand (e.g., as the prices of a 
weekend music festival pass for festival X increases, festivalgoers will 
readily switch to purchasing a similar pass to music festival Y).132 
Moreover, different markets can exist with a distinction between products 
in degree, as opposed to a distinction between products in kind; for 
antitrust challenges, this distinction means that a submarket may be 
considered a separate market.133 For example, in SFX, the court found that 
“nationally recognized EDM artists” are a submarket with distinct 
qualities because nationally recognized EDM artists require specific 
venues, attract a specific crowd that seeks EDM music, and often work 
with certain EDM promoters.134 Citing Nobody In Particular Presents, 
Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., the SFX court compared 
EDM concerts to rock concerts, asserting that rock concerts have a distinct 
customer base, and non-rock concerts are not substitutes for rock 
concertgoers.135 
                                                     
 128. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 30 (citing How Far Have Fans Traveled, supra note 
64). 
 129. See supra Figure 1. 
 130. See SFX, 2017 WL 3616562, at *9 (citing Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 
F.3d 917, 933 (6th Cir. 2005)); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467 
(1992); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 131. See id. (citing Nobody In Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. 
Supp. 2d 1048, 1075 (D. Colo. 2004)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. In finding a submarket, boundaries do exist when: (1) the industry and public recognition 
of the submarket as a separate economic entity exists and (2) when products with unique and distinct 
uses, qualities, processes, price sensitivities, production facilities, consumers, and vendors exist. Id. 
(citing Nobody In Particular Presents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1081). 
 134. See id. at 10–11. 
 135. Id. at 10 (citing Nobody In Particular Presents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1084). 
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However, in Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out Productions distinguishes 
between “the concert tour market” and “the concert festival market.”136 
The concert tour market is comprised of the live performances that artists 
book with concert venue promoters as part of their concert tour.137 Each 
performance (or concert) features the artist, and ticket sales are directly 
traceable to the artist (i.e., “hard-ticket sales”).138 Further, concert 
promoters seek to enter into contracts with artists from any and all music 
genres.139 However, the concert festival market is comprised of “large 
open-air events hosted over a few days or weeks in a single outdoor 
venue[, t]ypically, these large, outdoor festivals feature artists that span a 
variety of music genres.”140 Outdoor festivals offer a consumer experience 
different from single concerts.141 Customers will pay more and travel 
greater distances to experience such festivals than they would for a single 
concert.142 And, because these large music festivals often can sell out 
before the artists to perform are announced, ticket sales are not traceable 
to any single artist but, rather, to the music festival itself (i.e., “soft-ticket” 
sales).143 According to Soul’d Out Productions, hard-ticket concerts do not 
generally compete with soft-ticket festivals.144 
Once the relevant product and geographic markets are defined, the 
court can determine whether the defendant enjoys market power, which is 
normally inferred when an entity possesses a substantial percentage of the 
relevant markets.145 In SFX, once the court defined the relevant market as 
nationally recognized EDM artists performing in Metro Detroit, the court 
found that given the vast number of EDM artists who React contracts with 
and given the scope of its radius clauses, React had substantial control of 
the relevant market (finding that React controlled where and when 
nationally recognized EDM artists could perform and whether it would 
waive radius clauses).146 In Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out alleges that AEG, “the 
second largest presenter of live music and entertainment events in the 
world,” wields “substantial power in the music concert markets in the 
                                                     
 136. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 8–11. 
 137. See id. at 8. 
 138. See id. at 8–9. 
 139. See id. at 9. 
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Pacific Northwest.”147 Primarily, AEG’s market power is attributed to its 
ownership of many concert venues, its ownership of many music festivals, 
its ability to operate a ticketing company, and its ability to be the exclusive 
promoter for several artists.148 
It is important to note that “market definition is a deeply fact-
intensive inquiry,”149 requiring “inquiry into the commercial realities 
faced by the consumers.”150 So while the market definitions and 
subsequent market power findings in both SFX and Soul’d Out may seem 
logical, a plaintiff would need to verify the existence of such markets 
before either definition would be accepted by a court—a task easier said 
than done. 
Specific, relevant market definitions are not only essential to framing 
market power analysis but are equally critical to show anticompetitive 
effects. 
2. Showing Anticompetitive Effects 
Additionally, to demonstrate a Section 1 violation, the plaintiff must 
also show that the restraint on trade had adverse or anticompetitive effects 
in the relevant market.151 
The court in SFX found it plausible that the radius clauses used by 
React had anticompetitive effects in the market for nationally recognized 
EDM artists in Metro Detroit.152 In SFX, Eagle argued that when React 
contracted with hundreds of EDM artists, using radius clauses that 
prohibited the artists from performing (and advertising for) festivals and 
concerts within a 500-mile radius, those restrictions placed other concert 
promoters in the 500-mile radius in an unfair position.153 Specifically, 
other concert promoters were forced to either forgo contracting with many 
EDM artists or they had to agree to React’s harsh co-promotion 
agreements.154 Therefore, the effects of React’s radius clauses (1) 
                                                     
 147. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 13. 
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whole, not individual competitors . . . .”)). 
 152. See id. at 9. 
 153. Id. at 8–9. 
 154. React offered to allow EDM artists to perform at concerts and festivals that would otherwise 
be in violation of React’s radius clauses if the promoters and owners of these concerts and festivals 
entered into a co-promotion agreement with Eagle. Id. In the co-promotion agreements, React waived 
an artist’s radius clause in exchange for fifty percent of the profit made at the concert or festival the 
artist performed at. Id. 
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increased the price and cost of competition among EDM concert venues;155 
(2) limited entry of new competitors into the EDM market and limited the 
ability of current competitors to expand; and (3) raised concert ticket 
prices for consumers as a natural response to increased costs for 
promoters.156 
Similarly, in Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out Productions alleges that “AEG 
is reducing the supply of artists, which increases the costs for other 
festivals, limits consumer choice, and reduces artist, promoter, venue, and 
agent income.”157 In support, Soul’d Out Productions cites three large 
music festivals (Langerado, Monolith, and Sasquatch!) within Coachella’s 
geographic and temporal radius clause restrictions that have shut down in 
response to decreases in ticket sales and festival attendance.158 
Additionally, Soul’d Out Production cites to a 2017 LA Weekly article that 
discusses how radius clauses used by the largest music festival decrease 
the quality of other music festivals and harm smaller, less well-known 
artists that perform at music festivals after agreeing to the radius clauses 
in their performance contracts.159 Further, Soul’d Out Productions cited 
the published findings of Scott Hiller’s study of the economic effects that 
large festival radius clauses have on concert venues located within the 
radius clauses’ specific geographical restraints.160 
By comparing concert venues located within the geographical radius 
specified in the radius clauses of four American music festivals against 
concert venues located outside the same geographical radiuses, Hiller’s 
study revealed that concert venues located within the geographical 
radiuses were 7% to 28% more likely to shut down than concert venues 
located outside of the geographical radiuses.161 Because one of the four 
music festivals162 included in Hiller’s study was Coachella, Hiller’s study 
offers strong support that Coachella’s radius clauses have anticompetitive 
effects on concert venue promoters.163 Further, Hiller’s study offers strong 
support for the assertion that radius clauses with broad temporal and 
                                                     
 155. Id. 
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 157. Second Am. Compl., supra note 30, at 18. 
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 159. Id. at 19–21 (quoting from Bain, supra note 3). 
 160. Id. (citing Hiller, supra note 20). 
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 162. The four largest music festivals from Hiller’s study are: Coachella (Indio, CA), Austin City 
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Coachella. See Sisario, supra note 55. 
 163. Hiller, supra note 20, at 172. 
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geographic restrictions have anticompetitive effects on the concert tour 
market. 
From both SFX and Soul’d Out, it seems possible that large music 
festivals that use radius clauses with broad geographic and temporal 
restrictions could cause a decrease in the supply of artists available to other 
music festival and concert venue promoters. This could cause both a 
decrease in the quantity and quality of live music performances available 
to consumers and an increase in consumer prices (a natural response to a 
decrease in supply). However, similar to defining a relevant market, a 
plaintiff must verify such allegations at trial; no doubt this would be a 
burdensome undertaking. 
Assuming a plaintiff successfully shows that a radius clause used by 
a large music festival has an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market, 
in addition to showing the other four elements of a prima facie Section 1 
case, the rule of reason analysis burden-shifting framework would then 
place the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that any anticompetitive 
effects of the radius clauses are justified, and thus not unreasonable 
restraints.164 
3. Promoter Justifications 
If a large music festival promoter can show that radius clauses 
promote rather than suppress competition, the anticompetitive effects of 
the radius clauses will be justified—and therefore not a Section 1 
violation.165 Unfortunately in SFX, because the court was deciding a 
motion for summary judgment, the court never discussed the viability of 
React’s justification for its use of radius clauses.166 However, in its quick-
look analysis, the SFX court acknowledges React’s justification: “[T]o 
protect attendance at React’s events from being diminished by fans 
attending another performance of a featured artist elsewhere near the same 
date and location.”167 The court adds that this justification “is not as easily 
rejected.”168 
In Soul’d Out, AEG justifies its use of radius clauses for its 2018 
Coachella music festival169: 
While Plaintiff asserts that the clause is “unreasonable,” this 
allegation is conclusory, and undercut by Plaintiff’s own allegations, 
                                                     
 164. See SFX React-Operating LLC v. Eagle Theatre Entm’t, LLC, No. 16-13311, 2017 WL 
3616562, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017). 
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which show that the clause affords fair protection to AEG’s interests. 
The entire purpose of the radius clause is to protect AEG from 
competitors unfairly free-riding on its creative choices in selecting its 
artist lineup and its investment in ensuring those artists will come to 
the West Coast to play at the Coachella festival. As more festivals 
proliferate, maintaining a unique festival lineup is crucial for 
Coachella to remain competitive. And, as Plaintiff alleged, promoters 
incur substantial costs to compensate artists from all over the world 
for their travel and other expenses to perform at festivals. Plaintiff’s 
initial Complaint conceded the reasonableness of the radius clause by 
explaining that the radius clause prevented Plaintiff from free riding 
on AEG’s investment, requiring Plaintiff to “pay more money to 
bring artists in who are not already scheduled to be on the West Coast 
during Plaintiff’s festival.” Because the Soul’d Out Festival overlaps 
with Coachella, Plaintiffs are uniquely situated to profit off of AEG’s 
investment in Coachella by saving the costs AEG expended to bring 
artists to the West Coast. As the allegations in the Complaint show, 
the radius clause is tailored to protect these interests. It is restricted 
to performances at festivals or themed events—not all concerts—for 
less than five months surrounding the time of Coachella. The clause 
only restricts non-festival or themed performances in the counties 
immediately surrounding Coachella.170 
AEG not only justifies its use of radius clauses,171 it also anticipates 
the rule of reason’s burden-shifting framework172 and argues its radius 
clauses are appropriately tailored to restrict artists from performing only 
at festivals and themed events.173 However, while the radius clauses AEG 
used for the 2018 Coachella do not prohibit “all concerts,”174 they do 
prohibit artists from advertising, publicizing, or leaking “[a]ny tour dates 
in the states of California, Arizona, Washington and Oregon until January 
10, 2018 or when festival is announced, whichever is sooner.”175 
According to AEG, a concert promoter in Seattle, Washington, is free to 
contract an artist for a performance within weeks of the 2018 Coachella, 
but that promoter is restricted in their ability to advertise or publicize the 
performance—one must ask why a promoter would contract an artist that 
they cannot tell their customers about. 
In both SFX and Soul’d Out, the justifications for the restraints on 
trade that radius clauses create seem credible. As illustrated by the 
                                                     
 170. Mot. Dismiss, supra note 93, at 26–27 (citations omitted). 
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 172. I.e., that Soul’d Out Productions would have an opportunity to argue Coachella’s radius 
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promoters of Woodstock, putting on a large music festival is a risky 
endeavor, requiring large, up-front investments.176 If other music festival 
and concert promoters in the relevant geographic market were free to take 
advantage of an investing music festival’s efforts and, simultaneously, 
diminish the investing festival’s customer base, then eventually the 
investing music festival would either shut down or lose incentive to invest 
in future music festivals. 
Once a defendant offers viable justifications for otherwise 
anticompetitive effects of the restraint on trade, the rule of reason analysis 
shifts one last time to the plaintiff to show that any legitimate objectives 
the defendant has for utilizing the restraint on trade can be achieved by 
substantially less restrictive means.177 Part IV below offers insight into 
how a plaintiff could show substantially less restrictive means by defining 
two specific ways that a large music festival promoter’s radius clauses may 
restrict more competition than is necessary to protect its legitimate 
objectives. 
IV. DEFINING UNREASONABLE RADIUS CLAUSES 
As large music festivals continue to grow,178 the radius clauses that 
they employ will likely continue to intensify, both in their temporal and 
geographical restrictions. Therefore, it seems inevitable that a court will 
subject radius clauses used by large music festivals to a rule of reason 
analysis. When courts review radius clauses, they should find that some 
radius clauses used by large music festivals, like the ones used by the 2018 
Coachella,179 are overbroad and therefore violate Section 1. Radius clauses 
used by large music festivals violate Section 1 when they: (1) prohibit 
artist performances beyond the music festival’s geographic market and (2) 
do not effectively distinguish between concert performances and festival 
performances, which should, in most cases, be distinguished as different 
product markets. In both instances, the radius clauses restrict more than is 
necessary to protect large music festivals’ legitimate objectives. 
First, radius clauses used by large music festivals are unreasonable 
restraints on trade when they specify a geographical radius that exceeds 
the distance that consumers travel to attend a music festival or concert. 
Courts should be critical of a music festival radius clause that arbitrarily 
extends far beyond the average distance that a consumer will travel, 
because such restrictions cannot be justified by the promoter’s need to 
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protect ticket sales. Indeed, it seems that current music festival radius 
clauses specify broad geographic radiuses without careful, data-driven 
consideration for the area of effective competition that they need to 
protect. 
For example, the 2018 Coachella radius clauses specify broad and 
far-reaching geographical restrictions that restrict beyond the distance that 
consumers are likely to travel. The 2018 Coachella radius clauses state that 
artists shall not perform “[o]n any North American Festival” or advertise, 
publicize, or leak any festival, themed event, or tour date in California, 
Arizona, Washington, and Oregon.180 Coachella, located in Indio, 
California, is over 1,200 miles from Seattle, Washington.181 Yet according 
to Ticketmaster, a ticket sales and distribution company, the average 
festival attendee will travel only 903 miles to attend a large music 
festival,182 and the average attendee of a concert will travel only 43 
miles.183 Therefore, the 2018 Coachella radius clauses’ prohibitions that 
impact artists contracted to perform a concert in Seattle extend beyond the 
legitimate objectives for Coachella’s radius clauses. And although 
Coachella may feel the need to protect ticket sales from consumers outside 
the 903-mile distance the average consumer will travel, the prohibition on 
performing “any North American Festival” certainly reaches far beyond 
903 miles or any radius of effective competition. Therefore, courts should 
be critical of the specific geographical restrictions that large music festival 
radius clauses specify, asking whether the geographical restrictions 
unjustifiably exceed the geographical distance that consumers are likely to 
travel to attend the festival. 
Second, radius clauses used by large music festivals unreasonably 
restrain trade when they do not effectively distinguish between concert 
performances and festival performances, which should, in most cases, be 
distinguished as different product markets. Therefore, when a large music 
festival radius clause prohibits artists from performing or advertising for a 
concert, this restriction should be considered overbroad because it seeks 
to restrain trade in a product market that does not compete for its ticket 
sales. A relevant product market exists when products have reasonable 
interchangeability,184 which involves an analysis of the cross-elasticity of 
market demand.185 For example, a consumer shopping for a European 
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sports car is unlikely to view an American pick-up truck as a reasonable 
substitute. Likewise, in Soul’d Out, Soul’d Out Productions made a 
compelling case that concert performances are not a reasonable substitute 
for music festivals.186 At bottom, Soul’d Out Productions argues that 
although both music festivals and concerts feature live performances from 
musical artists, today’s large music festival promoters have created a new 
product—the large American music festival—that offers consumers a 
distinct experience from a concert performance.187 As such, prohibiting 
artists from performing in a different product market, i.e., concert 
performances, is outside the scope of a music festival’s relevant product 
market (or the market it expects competition from) and therefore should 
be deemed an overbroad and unreasonable restraint on trade in violation 
of Section 1. 
Indeed, Soul’d Out Productions’ argument is rooted in relevant 
antitrust law. For example, in International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. 
v. United States, the Supreme Court found that “championship boxing 
contests” constituted a separate relevant market from “all professional 
boxing events,” noting that, while both products share physical identities 
likely to place them in the same market, (1) the average revenue that 
championship boxing contests generate are significantly greater than other 
professional boxing events and (2) those in the business verified that a 
special, greater demand existed for viewing championship boxing 
contests.188 Similarly, there can be no question that large music festivals 
like Coachella generate gross revenues far exceeding even the most 
successful concert performance venues.189 Further, as discussed above, 
large music festivals additionally attract revenue from corporate sponsors 
eager to tap into a captive millennial audience.190 And the demand for large 
music festivals is unique from concert performances because customers 
are willing to pay more and travel farther to attend large music festivals 
than concert performances.191 Moreover, large music festivals sell out 
before the artists to perform are announced,192 which strongly supports the 
argument that music festival customers demand the festival experience 
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itself—unlike concert performances, where customers demand 
performances from a specific artist. 
Additionally, based on the precedent established in International 
Boxing Club of New York, potential exists to find separate relevant product 
markets amongst music festivals. Large music festivals also generate 
revenues and demand that is distinct from smaller music festivals, 
justifying a distinction between the two. For example, the 2017 Coachella 
grossed $114.6 million, and the 2018 Coachella festival passes cost 
between $429 and $999,193 whereas Soul’d Out Music Festival194 has 
grossed under $2 million in the festival’s total history and 2017 tickets 
ranged from $25 to $95.195 
However, in drawing a distinction between concert performances and 
music festivals, an exception for headlining artists is likely needed. Large 
music festival promoters’ legitimate objectives for using radius clauses 
must be considered (i.e., music festival promoters use radius clauses to 
protect their large, up-front investments to attract popular artists from 
other music festivals and concert promoters that may seek to free-ride and 
thus diminish the investing promoters’ customer base).196 For example, 
large music festivals contract with “headlining” artists (or widely popular 
artists likely to attract huge crowds) to increase the chance of a large or 
sold-out crowd that will help guarantee a return on the promoter’s 
investment.197 For example, the 2018 Coachella contracted for artist 
Beyoncé to headline one of the days of the festival; Beyoncé’s popularity 
and performance are so pronounced the 2018 Coachella is commonly 
referred to as “Beychella.”198 If a concert promoter were not prohibited 
from contracting a headlining artist like Beyoncé, because the radius 
clause would be barred from including a prohibition on concert 
performances, then that concert promoter may possess the ability to 
diminish the large music festival’s customer base for at least one day of 
the festival. This example reveals the need to consider music festival 
promoters’ legitimate objectives, balancing them against the 
anticompetitive effects of radius clauses, creating an exception to the 
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general proposal that radius clauses should be considered unreasonable 
when they fail to distinguish between concert performances and music 
festivals: a music festival radius clause may restrict a headlining artist 
from performing a concert within a reasonable geographic and temporal 
radius.199 
Therefore, when radius clauses used by large music festivals: (1) 
prohibit artist performances beyond the music festival’s geographic 
market and (2) do not effectively distinguish between concert 
performances and music festival as different product markets (except in 
the case of headlining artists), such radius clauses should be found to be 
overbroad and, therefore, an unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of 
Section 1. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of Woodstock, today’s music festival promoters have 
successfully created a consumer experience for festival-goers distinct from 
the traditional concert experience. But creating the large music festival 
experience is a difficult task requiring large, up-front investments from 
music festival promoters. In order to protect their return on these 
investments, music festival promoters use radius clauses. On their face, 
these radius clauses restrain trade by prohibiting the artist from performing 
or advertising for another music festival or concert for a specified temporal 
and geographical radius. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act only 
prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade that suppress competition and 
the market as a whole. To determine whether a music festival’s radius 
clauses are unreasonable, a court will likely subject the radius clauses to 
the fact-intensive, burden-shifting rule of reason analysis. Demonstrating 
to a court that radius clauses are causing harm to competition and the 
market as a whole will be an arduous task for any advocate; however, the 
data currently available—as sparse as it is—suggests competition and the 
market as a whole are, on balance, harmed by the most restrictive of radius 
clauses. Therefore, radius clauses used by music festival promoters that 
(1) prohibit artists from performing in a geographical radius beyond the 
festival’s relevant geographic market and (2) fail to distinguish between 
concert performances and music festivals should be found to be 
unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. 
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